











Obstacles Impeding  
the Regional Integration  

































EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR MINORITY ISSUES (ECMI) Schiffbruecke 12 (Kompagnietor Building) D-
24939 Flensburg Germany 
( +49-(0)461-14 14 9-0   fax +49-(0)461-14 14 9-19   e-mail: info@ecmi.de   internet: http://www.ecmi.de 
 2
ECMI Working Paper # 22  
European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) 













































© Copyright 2004 by the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) 
 
Published in September 2004 by the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI)
 3
 




III. BACKGROUND INFORMATION.................................................................. 5 
Geography and Demographic Balance ................................................................ 5 
Economy and Infrastructure................................................................................ 7 
Local Administrative Structures........................................................................ 11 
Recent History.................................................................................................. 13 
III. LOCAL ACTORS 1995-2004 ........................................................................ 16 
Political Parties................................................................................................. 18 
Power Structures at Village Level..................................................................... 19 
NGOs and Local Media .................................................................................... 20 
Main Donors and Implementers........................................................................ 25 
Foreign States................................................................................................... 28 
The Georgian State ........................................................................................... 31 
IV. THE VIEW FROM THE LOCAL POPULATION: TOP PRIORITIES .......... 33 
Economic/Infrastructure Priorities .................................................................... 33 
Political/Cultural Priorities ............................................................................... 35 














This working paper is a consolidated and condensed analysis of a longer field report   
originally carried out as part of ECMI’s action-oriented project “Defusing 
interethnic tension and promoting regional integration – the Javakheti Region of the 
Republic of Georgia”. Both the original field report, and this resulting analysis aim 
to provide an insightful overview of current the social, economic and political 
situation in two rayons (districts) of Georgia; Akhalkalaki rayon and Ninostminda 
rayon;  which together combine to form a geographical area better known as the 
Javakheti Region in southern Georgia. By identifying and providing information 
about the current problems impeding the regional integration of Javakheti, this 
working paper will act as a guide for defining priorities and ensuring more informed 
intervention in the area.   
 
Fieldwork was carried out in both of these rayons during the period 7 – 17 March 
2004 and is informed by data obtained from a total of forty-three interviews and 
also five focus group discussions.  This fact finding fieldwork was also successful 
in serving an additional purpose at grass roots level as it identified relevant key and 
pertinent stakeholders for the new and innovative inter-ethnic “Javakheti Citizens’ 
Forum” which will be initiated by ECMI in September 2004.  
 
Dr. Jonathan Wheatley is a Research Associate at the Free University of Berlin.   
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III. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
Geography and Demographic Balance 
 
The mountainous rayons (districts) of Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda combine to 
form the Javakheti Region in southern Georgia. The population of Javakheti is 
predominantly Armenian in ethnic origin. According to the 1989 USSR census, in 
Akhalkalaki 91.3% of the population were ethnic Armenian at that time, 4.4% 
Georgian, 2.5% Russian and 1.8% belonged to other ethnic groups. In Ninotsminda, 
the corresponding proportions were 89.6% Armenian, 1.2% Georgian, 8.4% 
Russian, and 0.8% for other groups. However, since that census was conducted the 
proportion of ethnic Armenians seems to have increased; according to Georgian 
government statistics on electoral registration, 95.3% of the population of 
Ninotsminda rayon and 93.6% of the population of Akhalkalaki rayon are ethnic 
Armenians1. 
 
In Akhalkalaki rayon, of the sixty-one villages with their own election precincts 
(i.e. all settlements with a population of approximately a hundred or more) fifty-one 
are predominantly Armenian, seven (Gogasheni, Apnia, Koteli, Okmi, Azmana, 
Pteni and Chunchkhi) are predominantly Georgian, two (Baraleti and Murjakheti) 
are mixed Armenian and Georgian and one (Khospio) is mixed Armenian, Georgian 
and Greek. In Ninotsminda, all of the thirty one villages with election precincts are 
predominantly Armenian, except for Gorelovka (mixed Armenian and Russian 
Dukhobor) and Spasovka (mixed but mainly Ajaran Georgian)2. 
 
The first major settlement of Armenians in Javakheti region occurred after the war 
between the Russian and Ottoman empires in 1828-29, when the Russian Empire 
occupied most of the region. At that time a large number of Ottoman Armenians 
decided to settle on the territory that was newly occupied by the Russians; mainly 
they settled in what is now Akhalkalaki rayon3. A second major wave of Armenian 
                                               
1 Oksana Antonenko, Assessment of the Political Implications of Akhakalaki Base Closure for the 
Stability in Southern Georgia: EU Response Capacities (CPN Briefing Study, September 2001), 
available at www.fewer.org/caucasus/dzhavakheti/cpnjavak901.pdf.   
2 There are (a very few) villages without their own election precincts. An example is Patara 
Khorenia in Ninotsminda district. 
3 Voitsekh Guretski, “The Question of Javakheti”, Caucasian Regional Studies, Vol.3, Issue 1 
(1998), available at http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/0301-05.htm.  
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settlers arrived after the forced expulsion of the Armenian population from Ottoman 
territory in 1915; a large proportion of the population of Akhalkalaki rayon and an 
overwhelming majority of the population of Ninotsminda rayon can trace their 
arrival in Javakheti to this event. 
 
A small number of Muslim Georgians (Meskhetians Turks) also traditionally 
inhabited the Javakheti region, although the vast majority of them lived in Samtskhe 
(i.e. Borjomi, Adigeni, Akhaltsikhe and Aspindza rayons). According to one 
source, 7,000 Meskhetian Turks lived in Javakheti in 19184. In 1944 however, all 
Meskhetian Turks were deported to Central Asia (mainly Uzbekistan) under 
Stalin’s orders and subsequently were not permitted to return. 
 
Another small community in Javakheti are the Dukhobors, ethnic Russians who 
came to the Javakheti region to escape religious persecution by the Tsarist state. 
They settled in seven villages in Javakheti: Gorelovka, Orlovka, Spasovka, 
Yefremovka, Bogdanovka (Ninotsminda), Tambovka and Rodionovka. In 1989, 
3,163 Dukhobors lived in Ninotsminda rayon5, although, according to some 
sources, earlier in the 1980s this figure was as high as 4,500-5,0006. However at the 
end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, many Dukhobors migrated from 
the region in response to the perceived anti-Russian feeling that emerged with the 
Georgian national liberation movement. Today, there are estimated to be only 900-
1,000 Dukhobors remaining in Ninotsminda rayon, the majority of whom, live in 
the village of Gorelovka (some 500-600)7. 
 
In 1989-90, the Georgian government embarked upon an initiative to resettle ethnic 
Georgians from Ajara (mainly Khulo rayon) in Javakheti following a series of 
landslides in their former home. Several Georgian nationalist groups such as the 
Merab Kostava Society were at the forefront of this resettlement initiative, 
purchasing the houses originally inhabited by the exiting Dukhobors. However, 
                                                
4 The Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, Ethnic-Confessional Groups and 
Challenges to Civic Integration in Georgia: Azeri, Javakheti Armenian and Muslim Meskhetian 
Communities (Tbilisi: CIPDD, 2002). 
5 The Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, Policy Brief: Javakheti in 
Georgia. Problems, Challenges and Necessary Responses (July 2000), available at 
www.fewer.org/caucasus/pbjav800a.pdf.  
6 Interviews with the author. 
7 Ibid.. 
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while a few Ajarans did indeed resettle, for the most part, local Armenians occupied 
the abandoned Dukhobor homes. 
 
During the Soviet period, Javakheti retained the status of a border zone and as such 
was subject to special restrictions. It was only possible to enter Javakheti with the 
special permission of Soviet border guards, who were deployed 78 km from the 
border with Turkey8. As a result, the gradual liberalisation that occurred in the rest 
of Georgia during the Brezhnev period and subsequently had little impact on 




Economy and Infrastructure 
 
The climate in Javakheti is extremely harsh. Akhalkalaki is situated at an altitude of 
approximately 1,700 metres above sea level and Ninotsminda is situated at an 
altitude of 1,950. Night-time temperatures are known to fall below minus 30 
degrees Celsius in winter and snow fall is common as late as April. 
 
Despite its poor climate, the predominant resource of Javakheti remains agriculture, 
and its agricultural output is shaped by its mountainous terrain and harsh climate. 
The primary crop grown is potatoes although some producers also grow cabbages, 
carrots and grain. In 2003, production of these products fell sharply due to a plague 
of field mice. The ability of a plague of rodents to seriously impact upon a whole 
harvest offers some indication of the now subsistence nature of agriculture in 
Javakheti. When the production of potatoes exceeds the needs of domestic 
consumption, they are sometimes sold in markets outside Javakheti, mainly in 
Tbilisi and Kutaisi. However, the cultivation of potatoes as a cash crop is unlikely 
to become a reality in Javakheti due to such imposing obstacles as fluctuating 
harvests, poor infrastructure and communications which hinder rapid transport of 
fresh produce, and administrative corruption, in particular demands for bribes by 
corrupt traffic policemen. There is also some livestock breeding (mainly cattle), but 
herds are relatively small and localised. Dairy products are mainly used for 
                                                
8 The Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, Ethnic-Confessional Groups and 
Challenges to Civic Integration in Georgia. 
 8
domestic consumption or are sold in local markets, but are rarely sold outside 
Javakheti due to a lack of technology for preserving milk or making cheese.  
 
As highlighted above, effective communication links in Javakheti are hampered by 
poor infrastructure and lack of accessibility. There exist only three road routes that 
connect Javakheti to the exterior. The most advanced link is the road which 
connects Akhalkalaki to Akhaltsikhe and which also forms the main transport route 
to Tbilisi. However, this road, while better than some others, remains in a poor 
physical state, ensuring that a 94-kilometre car journey from Akhalkalaki to 
Akhaltsikhe takes approximately two hours and journey times can be extended by a 
further three-and-a-half hours if the end destination is Tbilisi. Landslides can often 
barricade off this route, therefore further hindering regular, reliable and dependable 
access between Akhalkalaki, Akhaltsikhe and Tbilisi.  
 
The most direct route to Tbilisi, however, is the road from Ninotsminda via Tsalka, 
but the road is in even worse physical condition, ensuring that it is only possible to 
make this journey by four wheel drive during the summer period. Finally, the road 
south from Ninotsminda into Armenia is also in a state of poor disrepair and due to 
its high altitude is often blocked by snow during the winter. As for roads connecting 
the villages in the region, these are little more than dirt tracks and are very often 
blocked by snow. Thus many of the villages remain virtually isolated and 
inaccessible from the outside during the winter. There is one train from Tbilisi to 
Akhalkalaki via Tsalka every second day (powered by electricity as far as Tsalka 
and then by diesel), but the journey takes around ten hours and its schedule is often 
subject to interruptions, particularly in the winter. 
 
Industry in the region has virtually ceased to function. During the Soviet period, 
Javakheti was a major producer of basalt and pumice stone, which were exported to 
other parts of the Soviet Union, mainly Russia. There were also local plants that 
processed agricultural products. Finally, in Ninotsminda there was a large factory 
that produced knitted goods. Almost all of these industries are now closed as a 




Decline in agricultural and industrial production has continued relentlessly 
throughout the post-communist period. According to figures provided by the 
Governor’s Office of Samtskhe-Javakheti, between the first half of 1996 and the 
first half of 2001, industrial and agricultural production fell by 49.7% in the two 
rayons of Javakheti. This compares with a fall of 28.3% in the four rayons of 
Samtskhe. Total production is negligible in Javakheti, even if one compares it with 
neighbouring Samtskhe. Table 1 shows estimated figures for industrial and 
agricultural production and population in the six rayons of Samtskhe-Javakheti9.  
 
Given the virtual absence of local production, revenue from trade makes up a 
disproportionately high share of local income. The main items for trading are food, 
stone, timber and, in particular, oil products and gas. Much of this trade is of a 
contraband nature. As highlighted above, the Javakheti region is a border zone, and 
its role as a trading post is of particular strategic importance. In the aftermath of the 
war in Nagorno-Karabakh, no direct trade existed across the border between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan and thus all trade between the two countries had to be 
directed through Georgia. In this sense Javakheti provides a vital trade link, 
especially in the export of gas from Azerbaijan to Armenia. However, the lack of 
diversification in the economy has meant that whoever controls the border posts and 
the trade in gas and oil products automatically becomes a major player in the 
politics of the region. This has led to power at local level being concentrated in the 
hands of a few powerful economic groups, about which more will be said in the 
next section. 
 
Table 1: Industrial and Agricultural Output in Samtskhe-Javakheti, January – 
July 2001 
 
Rayon Population Industrial and 
Agricultural 
Output, January - 




Output per capita, 
January - July 2001 
(Lari) 
Adigeni 20,752 32.3 1.56 
                                               
9 Figures for industrial and agricultural production were taken from Oksana Antonenko, Assessment 
of the Political Implications of Akhakalaki Base Closure for the Stability in Southern Georgia and 
are based on figures provided by the governor’s office of Samtskhe-Javakheti. Figures for population 
were taken from the 2002 Census of Georgia, available at 
http://www.statistics.ge/Main/census/INDEX.HTM.  
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Akhaltsikhe 46,134 662.6 14.36 
Aspindza 13,010 252.5 19.41 
Borjomi 32,422 3245.7 100.11 
Akhalkalaki 60,975 71.3 1.17 
Ninotsminda 34,305 147.2 4.29 
Samtskhe 112,318 4153.1 36.98 
Javakheti 95,280 218.5 2.29 
Samtskhe-
Javaketi 
207,598 4371.6 21.06 
 
 
Emigrant remittances form the lifeblood of most rural families in 
Javakheti, cultivating a continuing dependency on the incomes of family members 
who have migrated. However this migration from the Javakheti region as a whole, 
tends not to be a concerted, sustained or long-term phenomena, but rather appears to 
be temporary or ‘seasonal’ in nature and fuelled mainly by pressing economic 
needs. A large proportion of the male working population from Javakhetian villages 
migrate to Russia every year, mainly to benefit from employment in the 
construction industry. However, although a significant minority emigrate 
permanently, most return to Javakheti during the winter period to tend their crops 
According to once source, in the village of Eshtia in Ninotsminda rayon 
approximately 1,700 individuals out of a population of 4,000 leave the village for 
seasonal work10. Since travel to Russia now requires a visa for Georgian citizens, a 
large number of offices have opened in Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda selling 
Russian visas. 
 
Finally, another crucial part of the local economy comes from the Russian military 
base located in Akhalkalaki. The revenue that the base brings in to the local 
economy is believed to amount to nearly USD 80,000 per month11. The impact of 
the Russian base on the political and economic life of the region will be discussed 
in greater detail later in this paper. 
 
                                                
10 Rostom Sarkissian, “Javakhk: Socio-Economic Neglect or Ethnic Unrest”, DWA Discussion 




The constant supply of electricity is also a problem, although the situation has 
improved somewhat recently, following an agreement between the Georgian and 
Armenian governments in November 2001 whereby Armenia agreed to provide 
electricity both to Tbilisi and directly to Javakheti. As a result, most residents of the 
region receive between 12 and 14 hours of electricity per day. In addition, there are 
also some small hydroelectric power plants which sell electricity to those who can 
afford to pay higher rates. Often these hydroelectric plants are the property of local 
power brokers in the region, and the possession of such commercial power reserves 
reinforces their position as part of the local economic elite12. 
 
Local Administrative Structures 
 
At rayon level and below, the administrative structure in Javakheti is, like in other 
regions of Georgia, a legacy of the communist period. The first layer of local 
government consists of locally elected bodies or sakrebulos for each of the two 
major towns (Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda) and for villages or communities (i.e. 
groups of villages or temi in Georgian) in rural areas. Akhalkalaki also has its own 
directly elected mayor, as do all towns in Georgia with a voting population of more 
than 5,000. As the voting population in Ninotsminda is less than 5,000, the head of 
the executive branch in the town is the chairperson of the sakrebulo, as specified by 
law. Since the new local election law came into force in 2001, for sakrebulo 
elections, voters are presented with a list of candidates and the five candidates 
obtaining the most votes are declared elected. For larger settlements seven or even 
nine sakrebulo members can be elected; for example, the town of Akhalkalaki 
elects seven members. In Javakheti most sakrebulos incorporate several villages, in 
contrast to most of the rest of Georgia where one sakrebulo generally includes only 
one or two villages (see below). 
 
The role of the sakrebulo in Georgia is mainly supervisory: they has the right to 
amend the local budget, approve long-term development plans and they has the 
right to evaluate the work of the executive bodies. They also has limited powers to 
impose and remove local taxes.  
 
                                               
12 For example, one such power plant that supplies electricity to Akhalkalaki is owned by the family 
of the former gamgebeli of Ninotsminda, Sergo Darbinyan. 
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Real power, however, rests with the executive branch of local government or 
gamgeoba at the second level of local government, i.e. the rayon (district) level. 
The Soviet-era division of Javakheti into two rayons – Akhalkalaki rayon and 
Ninotsminda rayon – remains in force today. The head of the rayon gamgeoba, 
known as the gamgebeli, is appointed by the President of Georgia from amongst the 
chairpersons of the town and community/village sakrebulos. Prior to the 2001 law, 
rayon gamgebelis were not required to have been elected to a sakrebulo. In reality, 
this new legal stipulation made little difference, as in both of Javakheti’s rayons the 
incumbent gamgebelis were able to retain their posts during the 2002 local elections 
by arranging to be elected to local sakrebulos. 
 
A third unofficial level of government was introduced by the government of Eduard 
Shevardnadze in 1994. These are the nine provinces or mkhare, which more or less 
correspond to the historical regions of Georgia and which are administered by an 
authorised representative or “governor”, appointed by the President of Georgia. 
Originally the governor’s post was entirely informal and not defined by law and, 
although the provinces acquired legal status when a new law on administrative 
territorial arrangement was passed in February 1997, the competences of the 
governor remain poorly defined13. Despite its historical significance, Javakheti was 
not designated a province; instead it was incorporated into the province of 
Samtskhe-Javakheti, which consists of the rayons of Akhalkalaki, Ninotsminda, 
Aspindza, Akhaltsikhe, Adigeni and Borjomi. Thus no administrative-territorial unit 
corresponds to Javakheti. 
 
There have been five governors of Samtskhe-Javakheti since the post was 
established. The first of these was Valeri Bakradze (1994-95). The second 
governor, Gigla Baramidze, was by far the longest-serving of the five, as he held his 
post from 1995 until February 2002. There then followed Temur Mosiashvili 
(February 2002 – August 2003) and Gela Kvaratskhelia (July – November 2003). 
Following a period of uncertainty that followed the so-called “Rose Revolution”, 
the former Ambassador to Armenia, Nikoloz Nikolozishvili was appointed 
governor in February 2004. Despite the area’s large ethnic Armenian population, all 
governors to date have been ethnic Georgians. 
                                               
13 See Ghia Nodia (ed.), Political System in Georgia, (Tbilisi: Caucasian Institute for Peace, 
Democracy and Development, 1998) at www.cipdd.org/cipdd_g/pdf/eurob_e.pdf. 
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As well as the gamgebeli all other major executive posts in the rayons, such as 
police chief, prosecutor and head of the Tax Inspectorate, are appointed by the 
centre in Tbilisi. Within Javakheti itself, however most of these individuals have 
been ethnic Armenians. 
 
Recent History  
 
As the Georgian national liberation movement gained momentum in the late 1980s, 
a parallel process was underway in Javakheti, where many members of the local 
population had contacts with fellow Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, where 
conflict between Armenians and Azeris had erupted in 1988-89. In 1988 the popular 
movement “Javakh” emerged as a co-ordination committee of local public 
organisations. Ostensibly, its aim was to promote Armenian culture, to protect 
national institutions and to promote the development of the region. Initially its 
members included Georgians, Russians and Greeks, but increasingly it came to 
constitute a kind of “popular front” for local Armenians and began advocating 
greater autonomy for Javakheti. By the early 1990s, the Javakh enjoyed widespread 
popularity, especially in Akhalkalaki rayon.  
 
During Gamsakhurdia’s term in office, Javakh dominated political life in the region. 
In February 1991, in response to perceived ethnic chauvinism on the part of the 
Gamsakhurdia government, a Provisional Council of Representatives was 
established in Akhalkalaki rayon. The Provisional Council, which was dominated 
by Javakh, consisted of 64 representatives from each village of Akhalkalaki rayon 
and eight representatives from the town of Akhalkalaki. A twenty-four member 
Council was formed from the Provisional Council and this body went on to elect a 
seven-member Presidium (one member of which was an ethnic Georgian). 
Throughout 1991, Javakh maintained full control of Akakalkalaki rayon, and armed 
formations loyal to the movement prevented Georgian military and paramilitary 
formations from entering the territory. The popular movement also successfully 
prevented Gamsakhurdia from imposing his choice of Prefect on the rayon of 
Akhalkalaki; after three successive nominees of Gamsakhurdia were forcefully 
prevented from entering the local government offices, the Georgian government 
was forced to accept one of the leaders of Javakh, Samvel Petrosyan, as Prefect 
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(gamgebeli) of the rayon. Following Petrosyan’s appointment in November 1991, 
the Council of Representatives was voluntarily disbanded. 
 
It is interesting to note that even in 1991, when tension between Javakh and the 
Georgian government was at its height, a motion demanding independence for 
Javakheti was rejected by the Provisional Council. Local Armenians maintain that 
the establishment of the council was merely a response to events in other part of 
Georgia and was not a manifestation of separatism14. 
 
Following Shevardnadze’s return to Georgia in March 1992, Javakh’s power base 
gradually began to diminish. Petrosyan retained his post for about a year, but 
resigned both as gamgebeli and as leader of the Javakh movement as internal 
divisions began to weaken the movement. Despite Javakh’s opposition, in 1994 the 
Georgian government created a de facto Georgian province out of Samtskhe-
Javakheti, and the President appointed his own “authorised representative” or 
governor to the province. Prospects for greater autonomy for Javakheti were further 
diminished by the negative attitude of Armenia’s then President, Levon Ter 
Petrosyan towards the idea. In late spring 1997, Presidents Shevardnadze and Ter 
Petrosyan met in Javakheti and the Armenian President made it clear that attempts 
to destabilise the situation in Javakheti would not be supported by the Armenian 
government15. 
 
The establishment of Samtskhe-Javakheti as a province with its own governor 
represented a serious setback for Javakh. The merger of the mainly Georgian 
Samtskhe with Javakheti was a clear signal that Tbilisi had no intention of granting 
any form of autonomy whatsoever to the Armenian population of Javakheti. In 
addition, the Georgian government adopted a strategy of “divide and rule” with 
respect to Javakh by offering leading members of the organisation administrative 
offices in local power structures such as the traffic police or the local pension 
fund16. Javakh then fell apart as other former leaders of the movement emigrated to 
Russia. Another group of former Javakh activists, led by another of the movement’s 
leaders, David Rstakyan, later established a new political movement called Virk, 
whose goal was to become a political party to lobby for Javakheti’s autonomy 
                                               
14 Guretski, “The Question of Javakheti”. 
15 Ibid.. 
16 Interviews with the author. 
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within Georgia. Although Virk has a significant number of supporters, to date, it 
has been unable to gain the sort of influence that Javakh once had and is yet to be 
officially recognised17. 
 
On the surface Javakheti has maintained stability since Shevardnadze’s government 
was able to defeat the most tenacious of the Georgian paramilitary groups (such as 
the Mkhedrioni) in 1994-95. However there have been certain stirrings of 
discontent, as a result of a combination of factors, such as the poor economic 
situation in the region and Tbilisi’s desire to remove the Russian military base in 
Akhalkalaki. Calls for greater autonomy are voiced periodically. In 1997, for 
example, members of Javakh collected signatures demanding the abolition of the 
administrative region (i.e. province) of Samtskhe-Javakheti and the establishment of 
a Javakheti province. Organisers of the petition claim that they were obstructed 
from collecting signatures by the police18. In an incident the following year, an 
armed group of local residents held up a Georgian army unit that was heading for an 
army range in Akhalkalaki rayon19. However, in the end the incident passed off 
peacefully. Unease at the prospect of the removal of the Russian military base 
increased in 1999, when Russia provisionally agreed to withdraw all its bases from 
Georgia at the Istanbul summit of the OSCE. The base is important for the local 
population both in terms of the economic benefits it provides and because of the 
perception that it provides military security from neighbouring Turkey (see below). 
                                                
17 Interviews with the author; The Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, 
Ethnic-Confessional Groups and Challenges to Civic Integration in Georgia: Azeri, Javakheti 
Armenian and Muslim Meskhetian Communities (Tbilisi: CIPDD, 2002), especially 29-30. This 
volume was accessed on the Internet at www.cipdd.org in June 2002. 
18 Guretski, “The Question of Javakheti”. 
19 The Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, Ethnic-Confessional Groups and 
Challenges to Civic Integration in Georgia. 
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III. LOCAL ACTORS 1995-2004 
 
Unlike in Kvemo Kartli, where ethnic Georgians occupy the majority of 
administrative positions, in Javakheti most power brokers at rayon level (e.g. 
prosecutor, police chief, gamgebeli) are ethnic Armenians. As highlighted above, 
only at provincial level (i.e. in Samtskhe-Javakheti) are most appointees ethnic 
Georgians. 
 
Officially, executive power in Javakheti rests with the centrally appointed heads of 
the rayon administration (gamgebelis). In Ninotsminda rayon, the gamgebeli, Rafik 
Arzumanyan, has remained at his post since 1993, while in Akhalkalaki rayon there 
have been no less than six changes of gamgebeli since Georgia became an 
independent republic. This would suggest that power at local level is somewhat 
more contested in Akhalkalaki than in Ninotsminda rayon. The present gamgebeli 
of Akhalkalaki rayon, Artur Eremyan, has occupied his post since December 2003. 
 
Since 1995, the deputies elected to parliament from Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda 
on the first-past the post basis have also wielded a very significant influence. These 
individuals and their families are believed to have controlled many of the economic 
resources of the region, especially the trade in oil and gas. 
 
Considerable power also rests with the police chiefs of the two rayons. In 
Ninotsminda, a single person has occupied the post of police chief throughout most 
of the post-independence period, except for a three-year absence in Moscow during 
the period 2001-2003, and he was reappointed following the “Rose Revolution”. In 
Akhalkalaki rayon, Mkhitar Abajyan became the chief of police in 2000; previously 
he had been head of the Tax Inspectorate of Akhalkalaki rayon. At the present time, 
Abajyan in considered by many to be one of the most powerful men in Javakheti. 
 
Reference is often made in the Georgian media and in popular literature to 
Javakheti’s so-called clans. However, it would be a mistake to consider these as 
clans in the sociological sense of the word as they basically consist of large families 
with good connections to top officials in Tbilisi and with sufficient economic 
leverage to win the loyalty of a number of clients at local level. The source of their 
influence is simply their control of key economic resources – mainly oil and gas – 
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rather than to any feelings of ‘clan loyalty’ amongst the population at large. In an 
economically deprived area such as Javakheti any group that is able to provide basic 
services to a small proportion of the population and to employ, one or two hundred 
people is likely to be – in local terms – influential. Thus I will henceforth refer to 
Javakheti’s clans simply as ‘economic groups’. 
 
Two primary economic groups have dominated political and economic life in 
Javakheti since 1995, although other smaller groups also exist and have a certain 
degree of influence. The two main groups are each headed by powerful individuals 
of Armenian nationality. Both of these individuals have been members of 
parliament during the period in question and both have attempted to instil their 
‘own people’ (whether relatives or clients) in the local bureaucracy. By means of 
their wealth and their capacity to provide (albeit limited) employment opportunities 
they have the capacity to mobilise a number of people to support them, especially at 
election time. Moreover, one of these two groups in particular has involved itself in 
charitable work, particularly (though not exclusively) during elections, by supplying 
wood and petrol to the villages and by repairing roads, schools, hospitals and water 
supply systems. 
 
In the light of the new situation that emerged after the events of November 2003, 
the economic groups began to reposition themselves politically. Generally this 
repositioning took the form of vying with one another as to who could be most loyal 
to the new government. Shortly after the Revolution, one of the two dominant 
groups rallied in Ninotsminda demanding the resignation of the gamgebeli of the 
rayon. However, Akhalakaki’s police chief intervened and prevented the 
demonstrators from achieving their goal.  
 
Many local observers believe these so-called clans to be artificial structures created 
by the government in Tbilisi to “divide and rule” Javakheti. By dividing the 
political elite, they argue, the central government ensures that no united voice is 
heard from Javakheti. The ‘clan’ leaders, they point out, were often on friendly 
terms during the late communist period and only later became rivals, as a result of 
conflicting business interests. Indeed it is clear that divisions within the local 
political and economic elite do not reflect any deep-seated sociological divisions 
within the population of Javakheti, and that the failure of the political elites to find a 
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common language reflects their inability to establish a meaningful dialogue with the 
population as a whole. What we see is a fractious local elite beset by personal 
rivalry and shifting alliances, easily manipulated by the centre and lacking the will 
and/or resources to respond to the needs of ordinary people (notwithstanding those 
sporadic acts of charity that members of this elite undoubtedly carry out for the 




Political parties only exist in a meaningful sense during the pre-election period and 
the vast majority of the local population do not identify with any political party at 
all. Generally, the population has voted for the party that represents the government 
in Tbilisi, not out of any real enthusiasm for the government’s policies but through 
the perception that the government at least provides stability and will not tolerate 
ethnic tensions or conflict. In addition, the leaders of the local economic groups 
have often used whatever means at their disposal to ensure that the vote of 
Javakhetians is effectively “delivered” to their patrons in Tbilisi. Thus, in the 1995 
and 1999 elections, most of Javakheti’s vote went to the Citizens’ Union of Georgia 
(CUG), while in the discredited November 2003 elections the pro-government “For 
a New Georgia” bloc also dominated. Similarly, in the repeat parliamentary 
elections of March 2004, the vast majority of votes went to the bloc supporting the 
new government, “National Movement – Democrats”.  
 
Nevertheless, despite this generally one-sided picture, other political parties have 
also gained the vote of certain sections of the population of Javakheti, either by 
winning the loyalty of members of the local elite or by promising that they will 
better represent the interests of Javakhetians than other political parties. These 
parties included the National Democratic Party and the Union for Democratic 
Revival in the late 1990s, as well as the New Rights and the United Democrats in 
the early 2000s. The United Democrats, founded by Zurab Zhvania following his 
split with former President Eduard Shevardnadze in late 2001, became especially 
influential as it was supported by the leader of one of the so-called economic 
groups. Today this party is a party of the new government. 
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Virk, and its leader David Rstakyan, although officially unrecognised, still 
undoubtedly enjoy a certain level of public support in Javakheti, especially in 
Akhalkalaki rayon, although it is difficult to estimate how many supporters they 
have. Virk (which is the medieval Armenian name for Georgia) has been attempting 
to register as a political party since it was set up in 1999, but so far without success. 
The ground for the central authorities’ refusal to register the party is that by law 
regional and ethnically-based political parties are prohibited. 
 
Generally, therefore, it can be said that political parties in Javakheti have not even 
entered the earliest stages of institutionalisation and have no roots amongst the 
population at large.  
 
Power Structures at Village Level 
 
Generally speaking, ethnic Armenian villages are not represented in official power 
structures. For example, the sixty-one villages with election precincts in 
Akahalkalaki rayon share twenty-one community (temi) sakrebulos, a ratio of 
around three to one, which is much higher than in the rest of Georgia. The ratio is 
even higher for ethnic Armenian villages; the seven Georgian villages share five 
sakrebulos while the remaining sixteen non-urban sakrebulos are shared among 
fifty-four Armenian and mixed villages. In Ninotsminda rayon the ratio is similar as 
thirty-one villages with election precincts share nine sakrebulos. This situation 
makes it problematic for many villagers to connect in any meaningful way to the 
local authorities, especially given the poor roads and frequent harsh weather 
conditions that make communication between neighbouring villages problematic. 
Thus, minor bureaucratic procedures that should be within the competence of the 
community sakrebulo are problematic for many villagers. In addition, many local 
observers claim that community sakrebulos are virtually powerless to solve local 
problems and are even unable to discharge those limited number of functions that 
lie within their competence. 
 
Some villages also have their own informal or ‘natural’ leader. These may be of any 
age, may come from a variety of social backgrounds and may gain their authority in 
a variety of different ways. Some were previously directors of collective farms or 
schools, others obtained a reputation in the Javakh movement (which, according to 
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some respondents, was a kind of ‘school’ in which a reputation as a leader could be 
made), some obtained influence through wealth and philanthropy, while others 
gained respect by obtaining an education in a major city such as Yerevan. There 
have been several instances of villages mobilising to protect their interests. For 
example, on one occasion residents of a village in Ninotsminda rayon rallied 
together in Ninotsminda in order to burn down the houses of two individuals who 
were suspected of killing a fellow villager. A more “civic-minded” example of 
collective action at village level was the decision of seven villages from 
Akahalkalaki rayon to establish registered NGOs in order to defend their interests 
(see below). 
 
However, despite the existence of some “strong” villages with their own “natural 
leaders” and with a capacity for collective action, many villages have neither of 
these resources. This state of affairs is exacerbated by the fact that in many villages, 
the majority of the economically active male population works in Russia either on a 
permanent basis or on seasonal work (mainly construction). Often a village is left 
without any respected figure to represent the community and is inhabited by 
women, children and elderly men who are too busy devoting their energies to their 
own survival and that of their families to be capable of acting on behalf of the 
village as a whole. 
 
NGOs and Local Media 
 
Local NGOs remain relatively new and underdeveloped in Javakheti in comparison 
with neighbouring Samtskhe, although there is some sign of growth in this sector. 
According to information published by the National Democratic Institute in early 
2003, there were eleven registered NGOs in Javakheti including seven in 
Akhalkalaki rayon and four in Ninotsminda rayon20. However, this information 
may already be out of date as, according to the Akhalkalaki Business Centre, seven 
NGOs have already been registered in seven villages in Akhalkalaki rayon and this 
figure does not include NGOs from the city of Akhalkalaki21. 
 
                                               
20 National Democratic Institute for International Affiars, Guidebook for Local Council Members 
Elected in 2002 (Tbilisi: National Democratic Institute, 2003) 
21 Interviews with the author. 
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In Akhalkalaki, it is likely that the two NGOs with the most influence and sway are 
the Akahlakalaki Business Centre, on the one hand, and the Centre for the Support 
of Reforms and Democratic Development, on the other. Akhalkalaki Business 
Centre was created in December 2002 and is funded by the Open Society Georgia 
Foundation (OSGF). It aims to improve the socio-economic situation in Javakheti 
and to promote small and medium-sized businesses. This NGO carries out 
consultations on business planning and market research and also liases closely with 
credit organisations such as World Vision and the International Orthodox Christian 
Charities in providing credit for developing businesses22. At the time of writing they 
were implementing two major projects: the first is an OSGF funded project that 
aims to promote the development of small and medium-sized businesses in the 
region and to improve socio-economic conditions, while the second is a project 
known as “Democratisation of the Educational System and Financial Transparency” 
and financed by USAID. 
 
The ‘Centre for the Support of Reforms and Democratic Development’ was 
founded earlier some time earlier, in 1997. The aim of this NGO is to bring together 
young people by providing them with information and by involving them in various 
courses and clubs. The Centre also serves as a resource centre and is home to 
Akhalkalaki’s only Internet café. The director of the Centre has also been 
attempting to provide translations of Georgian legislation in Russian, so that it may 
be accessible to the local Armenian population. In 2002, the director used a Tbilisi-
based agency to provide translations, but it was costly and somewhat time-
consuming. At the time of writing, he was in the process of establishing a ‘Centre 
for Legal Consultation’ in Akhalkalaki in collaboration with the Akhalkalaki based 
NGO, the ‘Union of Democrat Meskhs’. This is part of the legal consultation 
component of the OSCE’s Conflict Prevention and Integration Programme for 
Javakheti (see below) and is aimed at providing knowledge of Georgian legislation 
to the Armenian population. 
 
Through his close contacts with the ‘Union of Democrat Meskhs’, the director has 
been attempting to build a network connecting NGOs and political organisations in 
Javakheti with corresponding organisations in Tbilisi. He has therefore maintained 
contact with social scientists and with representatives of non-governmental 
                                               
22 Ibid.. 
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organisations in Tbilisi, such as the ‘South Caucasus Institute of Regional Security’ 
(SCIRS), and the ‘Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development’ 
(CIPDD). Following the Rose Revolution, the director of the Centre for the Support 
of Reforms and Democratic Development in Akhalkalakhi took part in many round 
table discussion groups in the region and in Tbilisi was present at a meeting 
organised by CIPDD, which brought together President Mikheil Saakashvili and 
various representatives of ethnic minorities, both from Samtskhe-Javakheti and 
from Kvemo Kartli. According to the director, a wide range of issues were 
discussed, and the new authorities appeared to demonstrate a genuine will to clear 
up the major problems in the region. 
 
In Ninotsminda the first NGOs were established in 1997 under the initiative of 
Albertine Smit and Otar Ginosyan as part of a major NGO capacity-building project 
that was mainly funded and implemented by the UNV (United Nations Volunteers). 
Smit and Ginosyan were in some sense the pioneers of the NGO sector in 
Ninotsminda, and as a result of their work, NGO activity was initiated earlier in 
Ninotsminda than in Akhalkalaki. Nevertheless, the generally low level of NGO 
activity in Ninotsminda today testifies to problems relating to the sustainability of 
NGO activity once donor money runs out. One NGO that was established in 1997 
and is still working effectively today is the women’s NGO “Paros”, run by 
Ginosyan’s daughter, Naira Ginosyan. With funds from OSGF, “Paros” has opened 
a kindergarten and a computer centre in Ninotsminda. They have also carried out 
training in leadership and democracy, mainly focusing on women in both 
Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki rayons. The training carried out in Ninotsminda (in 
2002) was part of the DFID funded Georgia Governance and Civil Society Project 
(GOCISP) project (see below), while the training in Akahalkalaki (in 2003) was 
part of a UNV project. 
 
Smit and Ginosyan were also instrumental in the re-opening of the local television 
station in Ninotsminda, Parvana TV. This project was implemented in 1998 by 
UNV with funding from the Dutch government and it resulted in Parvana being able 
to resume broadcasting after a hiatus of several years. Parvana is able to keep local 
residents informed of the latest developments by drawing on information from other 
news channels and producing their own news bulletins on the basis of this 
information. Since 2003 as part of the OSCE’s Conflict Prevention and Integration 
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Programme and with the assistance of the news agency Internews, Parvana has also 
provided simultaneous translation into Armenian of two Georgian news 
programmes: the State Channel 1 news programme “Moambe”, and Rustavi-2’s 
“Kurieri”. As part of the same project, Akhalkalaki’s independent television station 
“ATV-12” has been simultaneously translating precisely the same news 
programmes for the population of Akhalkalaki. The accessibility of Georgian news 
is a major issue in Javakheti, given that the majority of the local population do not 
speak Georgian and therefore have to rely on news from either Moscow or Yerevan 
to keep them informed. Three Georgian channels are available in Javakheti: State 
TV, Imedi and Ajara TV. However, the first two of these channels broadcast only in 
Georgian and the third has not been renowned for either its objectivity or for the 
high quality of its programmes. 
 
Another local organisation that is worthy of mention is the Ninotsminda-based 
‘Society of Dukhobors’. Its leaders claim that the Society has existed, in one form 
or another, since the Dukhobor community arrived in the area in 1841. The main 
aim of the Society is to protect the cultural identity of the declining Dukhobor 
community. During the Soviet period the society played a major role in organising 
all sorts of cultural events in the Dukhobor villages, such as concerts, art exhibitions 
and dances. Now its scope for action is somewhat more limited, given the high 
percentage of out-migration and financial restraints. They obtain some financial 
support from the Russian Embassy and with this they are able to provide some text 
books to school children and send a few children on cultural trips to Moscow and to 
religious functions in Tbilisi. The Society has a Council of twenty respected 
Dukhobor community leaders from the seven Dukhobor settlements (see above)23. 
 
Turning to the small NGOs and CBOs that have been established in rural areas of 
Javakheti, at the time of writing at least six registered NGOs and at least twelve 
unregistered Community Initiative Groups (CIGs) had been established. The six 
registered NGOs are located in the villages of Khospio, Abuli, Olaverdi, Baraleti, 
Gogasheni and Apnia in Akhalkalaki rayon. All have received grants from the 
Horizonti Foundation, mainly for small-scale infrastructure projects, such as 
repairing roads, schools and water supply systems. The “GEA” NGO in Khospio 
has also received a grant from CHF International. The twelve unregistered CIGs 
                                               
23 Ibid.. 
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have been established by Mercy Corps as part of a larger community mobilization 
program in Eastern Georgia: ten operate at village level and two at sakrebulo level. 
At village level, these CIGs are to be found in the villages of Gokio, Alastani, 
Varevani and Godolari in Akhalkalaki rayon, and Jigrasheni, Didi Gondura, Patara 
Gondura, Dilip, Mamzara and Kulalisi villages in Ninotsminda rayon. At sakrebulo 
level, CIGs have been established in Alastani and Gondura. 
 
Finally several national NGOs have done a considerable amount of work in the 
region. Probably the most active organisation in this respect is the ‘Caucasian 
Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development’ (CIPDD). CIPDD has been 
working in Javakheti for several years and their work has concentrated on the 
following areas: a) research into the social, political and economic situation in the 
region, b) drafting policy papers for international organisations such as the OSCE 
and UNDP in order to help them define their priorities, c) monitoring of conflict 
potential for the High Commission for National Minorities of the OSCE, and d) 
establishment of round table discussion groups that have brought together 
politicians, sociologists and NGO representatives from both Javakheti and Tbilisi. 
 
The topics covered in these round table discussions have been diverse in nature. In 
the early days the emphasis was on NGO capacity building, although subsequently 
it shifted to topics such as language policy and the relationship between minorities 
and state policy. Generally, in the early stages, discussions focused on less 
controversial issues, but as confidence grew it became possible to tackle the more 
contentious issues, such as the presence of the Russian military base and the 
possibility of the return of the Meskhetian Turks. CIPDD aimed to invite and 
include representatives of central government. In fact the then Chairman of the 
Parliamentary Committee for Civil Integration (later briefly governor of Samtskhe-
Javakheti) took part in discussions with key local stakeholders.  
 
The ‘South Caucasus Institute of Regional Security’ (SCIRS) has also carried out 
significant work in Javakheti and has been attempting to create a kind of “think 
tank” in which various interested parties from both Tbilisi and Samtskhe-Javakheti 
are able to participate. Their aim is to highlight and discuss problems that exist 
between the outlying regions and the political centre and to attempt to arrive at a 
formula that is mutually acceptable to all groups. This is part of SCIRS’s general 
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strategy of creating networks of think tanks to assist regulate potential conflicts 
across the Caucasus region as a whole.  
 
Main Donors and Implementers 
 
Over the last eight years the United Nations Volunteers (UNV) has funded and 
implemented far more projects in Javakheti than any other international 
organisation. As well as the NGO capacity building projects described above, UNV 
has implemented small business capacity building projects, youth activity projects 
and a cultural exchange project. The majority of UNV’s projects have been 
implemented in Ninotsminda. However, UNV terminated its activities in the region 
in 2003. 
 
More recently Horizonti’s Samtskhe-Javakheti community development 
programme, funded by the Open Society Georgia Foundation (OSGF), launched at 
the end of 2001, has been establishing a framework in which villages can identify 
and solve their most pressing problems. Unlike some other community development 
projects which attempt to impose a model ‘from above’, Horizonti adopted a more 
grass roots approach by encouraging the initiatives to come from the villages 
themselves and then provided funds once these initiatives were approved. They first 
announced their intention to launch the project to all sakrebulos in Akhalkalaki and 
Akhaltsikhe rayons and encouraged the sakrebulo members to spread the word to 
fellow villagers. They then held a series of meetings in the villages in which around 
8-10 representatives from each village were present in order to explain the terms of 
the project. Interested villages then selected an initiative group of 7-18 people, who 
were confirmed at a general meeting of the village, and the initiative group was then 
encouraged to draft a medium-term (5-7 year) strategic development plan. Each 
initiative group also drew up a project proposal to solve the most pressing problem 
of the village, complete with project description, business plan and budget. The 
maximum budget was set as USD 15,000 for each village. It was as a result of this 
project that CIGs (later registered as NGOs) were established in Khospio, Abuli, 
Olaverdi, Baraleti, Gogasheni and Apnia (see above) and were able to carry out the 
above-mentioned infrastructure projects. 
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However, if we look a little more closely at the recipient villages, we see that of the 
six villages, two are predominantly Georgian (Gogasheni and Apnia), two are 
mixed (Khospio and Baraleti) and two are Armenian (Abuli and Olaverdi). 
Moreover, if we consider the chairpersons of the NGOs, we see that three are ethnic 
Georgians, two are Armenians and one is Greek. Thus there would seem to be 
rather fewer Armenians represented in these organisations than one would expect 
given their numerical dominance in Javakheti. In addition, out of these six 
chairpersons, two are members of the relevant community sakrebulo and another 
two are relatives of sakrebulo members. Thus, while the establishment of these 
NGOs can be rated as a success in terms of the results achieved, difficulties in 
representing all sections of the population remain. 
 
Since September 2000, Mercy Corps has also been implementing community 
mobilisation initiatives in Javakheti as part of the USAID-funded East Georgia 
Community Mobilization Initiative. CIGs have been created and have implemented 
projects aimed at infrastructure rehabilitation (see the above section on NGOs and 
media above). Unlike its partner organisation, CARE, which implements similar 
USAID-funded projects in western Georgia, Mercy Corps operates an informal 
system in which CIGs very often remain unregistered and therefore more flexible. 
Mercy Corps operates both at the level of the community sakrebulo and at village 
level; in those sakrebulos that include more than one village, Mercy Corps 
establishes CIGs at both levels with each level producing its own proposals. The 
aim is that the two sets of proposals should complement one another. As mentioned 
above, Mercy Corps has created ten CIGs at village level and two at sakrebulo level 
in Javakheti.  
 
In 2003 the UNDP launched its Samtskhe-Javakheti Integrated Development 
Programme. The project aims “to promote social cohesion among different ethnic 
and confessional groups, to strengthen the capacity of the local and central 
governments to respond to community needs and interact with different 
stakeholders, to improve communication and access to information for the 
population in the region, to reduce the risk of tensions related to access to 
productive assets and resources, to improve the socio-economic situation and 
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reduce the isolation of the region from the rest of Georgia”24. The UNDP opened an 
office in Akhalkalaki in 2003, and (apart from ECMI) is the only international 
organisation to have an office in Javakheti. 
 
Another project worthy of note is the DFID-funded Georgia Governance and Civil 
Society Project (GOCISP), which began in 2000 and closed in 2002. GOCISP 
concentrated on local government capacity-building and, with this end in mind, 
carried out a series of interactive seminars in different rayons of Shida Kartli and 
Samtskhe-Javakheti, mainly amongst elected members of local government and 
local government staff. These seminars focused on a) medium and long-term 
policy-making, b) helping councillors to understand their roles and responsibilities, 
and c) assisting them with local constituency building. In Javakheti, the project 
focused mainly on Ninotsminda rayon. 
 
The OSCE’s Conflict Prevention and Integration Programme is a new project, 
which is ambitious in its scope and incorporates several components. Although the 
programme began formally in May 2003, one component – Georgian language 
courses for (ethnic Armenian) civil servants – began in May 2002 and teaching 
began in October of the same year. In the first year of the project 154 Armenian-
speaking civil servants from Akhaltsikhe, Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda rayons 
received training in the Georgian language. Within the framework of the project, 
Georgian lessons are already being given to first-year students at the Akhalkalaki 
branch of Tbilisi State University. Another component of the Conflict Prevention 
and Integration Programme is the "News Re-Broadcasting in the Minority 
Language Project, Georgia", which involves the simultaneous translation of 
Georgian news broadcasts and which was outlined above. Finally, the establishment 
of the Centre for Legal Consultation in Akhalkalaki implemented by the Union of 
Democrat Meskhs together with the director of the Centre for the Support of 
Reforms and Democratic Development (see above) is also part of this Programme. 
 
Another international donor organisation that has been operating in Javakheti is the 
International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC). IOCC’s activities covered two 
areas: humanitarian aid and the development of small businesses. In the first area, 
the organisation provided free school meals to schoolchildren between the ages of 
                                               
24 See www.undp.org.ge/Projects/samjav.html.  
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six and ten. Meanwhile, in the field of business support, IOCC conducted training 
seminars and offered credit lines to small businesses. At the end of 2003, after the 
end of a four-year period, IOCC decided to discontinue its representation in 
Javakheti, although they still work in Akhaltsikhe. 
 
Finally, other international organisations have carried out small projects in 
Javakheti. For example, the Eurasia Foundation funded the establishment of a 
consumer rights organisation in Ninotsminda, while Oxfam Georgia and the Dutch 
Embassy jointly funded a potato-farming project in 1997. In addition, World Vision 
is currently establishing a program in Samtskhe-Javakheti funded by the European 
Initiative for Human Rights and Good Governance, and is about to open a 
community centre in Ninotsminda.  
 
Despite these undoubtedly significant initiatives, however, there remains the 
perception in both rayons that the population of Javakheti has been somewhat 
neglected by the international community, especially in comparison with 
Akhaltsikhe. Many point to the fact that very few international donor organisations 





The two foreign states that have by far the most influence on social, political and 
economic developments in Javakaheti are Russia and Armenia. The influence of the 
former is primarily military and economic, while the influence of the latter is 
mainly social and cultural. It is worth examining the influence of each in turn. 
 
The 62nd Divisional Russian base that is located in Akhalakaki influences society in 
Javakheti, in particular Akhalkalaki raton, in two ways: economically and 
psychologically. In the first place, the base provides employment to many 
inhabitants of Akhalkalaki; estimates vary widely as to the number of jobs the base 
provides, but the minimum estimate is that around 1,000 local people are employed 
as military personnel, plus an indefinite number of non-military service personnel. 
Other estimates put the total number of people employed there as high as 3,000. 
Most of those employed there live either in Akhalkalaki, close to the base, or in the 
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neighbouring villages of Diliski or Vachiani25. When one considers that the 
population of Akahalkalaki is around 10,000 and that the population of the two 
neighbouring villages is no more than two-and-a-half thousand, and if we assume 
that the average extended family in the region consists of seven or eight members, it 
would seem reasonable to assume that at least half of families in the city and these 
two villages are supported by someone who works at the base. Moreover, since 
rates of pay are relatively high (approximately USD 100 per month for military 
personnel), employees at the base also provide a market for rural inhabitants to sell 
their produce. Finally, as Russian military vehicles are not stopped at customs, the 
base serves as a black market for a variety of goods (particularly cigarettes) that are 
imported from Russia26. Thus, in the words of Oksana Antonenko, “the base in 
Akhalkalaki has de facto fulfilled many of the traditional state functions such as: 
providing security, employment opportunities, education and social security to the 
local inhabitants”27. In a region in which income-generation is virtually non-
existent, its contribution to the local economy is hard to underestimate. 
 
As well as the economic benefits that it provides to local residents, the Russian base 
also provides psychological reassurance as a guarantee of defence against 
neighbouring Turkey. As noted above, a large part of the population came 
originally from eastern Anatolia, whence they were expelled during the First World 
War, and many still consider themselves to be refugees. In the minds of the 
population, therefore, Turkey is still seen as a hostile power, especially given its 
refusal to recognise what they refer to as the Armenian genocide of 1915. Although 
most neutral observers would perceive fears of a Turkish invasion to be unfounded 
(particularly given Turkey’s desire to join the EU), Javakheti has suffered from an 
informational vacuum both during the Soviet period, when it was a restricted border 
zone, and also subsequently, when information was sparse and came mainly from 
Armenian and Russian sources. Thus, the population have a distorted picture of 
geopolitical reality and see Turkey as a major threat to their continued existence. 
 
However, despite their generally favourable attitude to the Russian base, the local 
population does not unconditionally support the Russian presence. Local military 
                                               
25 Antonenko, Assessment of the Political Implications of Akhakalaki Base Closure for the Stability 
in Southern Georgia. 
26 Sarkissian, “Javakhk: Socio-Economic Neglect or Ethnic Unrest”. 
27 Antonenko, Assessment of the Political Implications of Akhakalaki Base Closure for the Stability 
in Southern Georgia. 
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personnel who work at the base are required to take Russian citizenship, and as 
Russian citizens they are always liable to be moved to another base within the 
Russian Federation. Recently this practice of transferring local staff out of 
Akhalkalaki appears to have become more frequent, and this has led to a certain 
degree of resentment. Some respondents even believe that it would eventually be 
acceptable to withdraw the base once economic opportunities are provided and once 
either the Georgian state or the international community can provide Javakheti with 
security from Turkey. 
 
From the geopolitical perspective, Russia feels it needs to maintain the base to 
maintain its leverage over Georgia and to counter Georgia’s desire for ever closer 
links with the West and NATO. Despite a provisional agreement by Russia to 
withdraw its forces from all military bases in Georgia that was signed at the 
Istanbul summit of the OSCE in November 1999, Russia still has not withdrawn its 
forces from Akhalkalaki and appears to be in no hurry to do so. Some in Georgia 
fear that Russia may attempt to instigate unrest in Javakheti in order to preserve her 
military presence there. 
 
Armenia, on the other hand, has attempted to maintain good relations with the 
Georgian state and has deliberately not encouraged any separatist aspirations in 
Javakheti. Good relations with Georgia are particularly important for Armenia as 
Georgia provides the only transit route for Armenian goods to western markets, 
since the trade route west into Turkey has been blockaded since the war in 
Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia is thus dependent on Georgia for trade. Georgia also 
provides access to Armenia’s strategic ally, Russia. 
 
Although the Armenian state has made every effort not to inflame tensions in 
Javakheti, there is one political organisation whose official policy is to incorporate 
Akhalkalaki rayon into Armenia. This is the Dashnaktsutyun party, which, since 
2000, has been allied with the Armenian president, Robert Kocharyan. 
Dashnaktsutyun certainly has links to some political circles in Javakheti, although 
there is no evidence to suggest that the party is actively and openly promoting a 
separatist agenda. Despite his alliance with the Dashnaks, it is highly unlikely that 
the Armenian president would support such a move. 
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Generally local politicians in Javakheti maintain close links with political circles in 
Yerevan. In the period immediately following the Rose Revolution in Tbilisi, 
several of these local power brokers met with their Armenian counterparts in 
Yerevan in order to work out how to respond. Yerevan has hitherto been able to 
restrain the more radical elements in Javakheti and this has contributed to continued 
stability in the region. 
 
The main influence of Armenia on Javakheti is primarily of a cultural nature. Given 
its isolation from the rest of Georgia, most young intellectuals in Javakheti go to 
Yerevan to complete their higher education28. Moreover, as has been noted above, 
the local population relies to a large extent on Armenia for their sources of 
information, as the language barrier prevents them from receiving up-to-date 
information from Tbilisi. In many ways, therefore, it could be said that Javakheti 
falls into the Armenian rather than the Georgian cultural space. 
 
 
The Georgian State 
 
Since 1995, the policy of the Georgian state towards Javakheti can best be classified 
as one of benign neglect. On the one hand, the Georgian government has made no 
attempt to intervene in the cultural affairs of local Armenians and token attempts to 
teach the state language were regarded as more symbolic than real. At the same 
time, it has attempted to maintain stability and to minimise the appeal of separatism 
by maintaining a close relationship with the Armenian government and by 
handpicking its own loyal members from the local Armenian elite to form the 
administration at rayon level. The province of Samtskhe-Javakheti was created in 
order to further reduce the risk of separation and a Georgian governor with close 
links to local Armenian economic elites (Gigla Baramidze) was selected to 
administer the province. 
 
On the other hand, the government made no effort whatsoever to develop Javakheti 
economically or to integrate it in any meaningful way within the Georgian state. 
According to critics of the Shevardnadze government, the population of Javakheti 
was deliberately maintained poor and ignorant so that the votes of the local 
                                               
28 Guretski, “The Question of Javakheti”. 
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population could more readily be “delivered” to the governing party. Whether 
deliberate or not, the policy of simply “leaving Javakheti to its own devices” has 
caused considerable resentment in the region. According to David Rstakyan, the 
leader of the political organisation Virk, although the Armenian population 
themselves consider Javakheti to be a part of Georgia, the Georgian side has 
hitherto seemed to believe that Georgia stops at Akhaltsikhe29. The economic 
“neglect” of the region is even characterised by some local observers as “white 
genocide” as if it was designed to force the Armenian population to emigrate. While 
others recognise that other regions of Georgia have experienced similar neglect, 
they argue that when Georgians from other regions complain about this state of 
affairs they are at least listened to, while if the Armenian population of Javakheti 
complain, they are accused by Tbilisi of harbouring separatist sentiments. 
 
The new government that took power in Georgia after the Rose Revolution and 
Mikheil Saakashvili’s election as President of Georgia has yet to elaborate a policy 
on ethnic minorities in general and on Javakheti in particular. Discussion has so far 
centred around certain rather vague proposals to reform the administrative-
territorial arrangement of the country, but even on this issue no clear policy has as 
yet been elaborated. Opposition parties also lack any clear policy on ethnic 
minorities. In part this is due to a lack of information; few political leaders have any 
in-depth knowledge of matters relating to areas where ethnic minorities are 
concentrated. The policy vacuum is also part of a wider malaise that is common to 
many former Soviet republics; having had no experience of policy formulation 
during the Soviet period, republican elites often react retroactively to events and fail 
to adopt any long- or even medium-term strategy to overcome the most pressing 
social and economic problems facing the country. 
 
Another enduring legacy of the Soviet period is that of ethnocentrism. While few 
political leaders in Georgia today would go so far as to echo Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s 
characterisation of ethnic minorities as ‘guests’, there is, in the minds of many 
Georgians, a suspicion that ethnic minorities must necessarily be disloyal. This 
perception is shared by many members of the political elite, who consider ethnic 
minorities to be a problem, rather than as vital human capital that could contribute 
to the future development of the country. 
                                               
29 Interviews with the author. 
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IV. THE VIEW FROM THE LOCAL POPULATION: TOP PRIORITIES 
 
As in every part of the world, opinions in Javakheti diverge; however after hearing 
the opinions of a large number of respondents to this survey, a set of common 
priorities reveals itself. For the purposes of this paper it is best to classify these 
priorities into two broad areas: economic/infrastructural, and political/cultural. The 
general trend observed, especially amongst those not working directly in state 




All respondents complain about the dire economic situation in Javakheti and the 
poor infrastructure. Most expressed regret at the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
insofar as the breakdown of the Soviet state was associated with the collapse of the 
local economy, and many looked back with nostalgia towards those days when 
factories and collective farms worked normally and life was relatively comfortable. 
The most commonly voiced concern was that of very high levels of unemployment, 
which force most of the economically active population to migrate to Russia in 
search of seasonal work. Many respondents therefore emphasised the need to boost 
local production, especially agricultural production, in order to reverse this trend of 
outward migration and cited many reasons why this was not possible in the current 
circumstances. 
 
The most common problem cited for the lack of agricultural development was the 
lack of modern agricultural machinery, fertilisers and seeds (especially potato 
seeds). Respondents also cited a more immediate problem and one, which is 
potentially devastating – the plague of field mice that destroyed much of last year’s 
potato and grain crop. Several expressed the desire that local factories be 
established to process agricultural products, as virtually all such factories that 
previously existed have shut down. 
 
Access to land is not such a major problem as most households received between 1 
and 1.25 hectares of land during the land privatisation process in the early to mid 
1990s. However, there is a problem of land fragmentation as many households have 
a part of their land plot in the village in which they live and another part several 
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kilometres away. This is a legacy of the collective farm system during the Soviet 
period in which several villages would belong to one collective farm. When the 
collective farms were dismantled and land was redistributed, there was no guarantee 
that every household would receive land that was close to the place of dwelling. 
Fragmentation of land, combined with the lack of machinery, seeds and fertilisers 
cited above, makes it difficult to raise agricultural production above subsistence 
level. 
 
In relation to local infrastructure, the poor state of the roads was most the 
commonly cited problem. This makes it difficult for local producers to sell their 
products to markets outside Javakheti. The absence of a reliable road direct to 
Tbilisi isolates Javakheti from the rest of the Georgian market and this problem is 
exacerbated by demands for bribes from the traffic police for those who dare to 
make the journey. Thus, transporting one’s potatoes or cabbages to other parts of 
Georgia is simply not profitable. In addition, the fact that roads connecting 
neighbouring villages as well as those connecting the villages with the two main 
towns are very often closed during the winter period makes it problematic for 
villagers to gain access to the rayon centres either for bureaucratic reasons or (more 
importantly) to receive medicines. 
 
Other respondents pointed to the dire state of the educational infrastructure. Many 
schools have not been repaired for at least fifteen years; the roofs of school 
buildings are often in a degraded state and in some schools glass is even lacking in 
the windows. The heating of school buildings is therefore a very major problem, 
given the lack of a central heating system and the harsh climatic conditions in 
winter. In many villages, children have to bring their own wood to school in order 
to supply the wood stove, which is usually the only source of heat in school 
premises. 
 
Another common complaint is the lack of potable water. In many villages, the 
village is supplied by one water pipe, which arrives at a common collection point in 
the village centre. Generally, the women of the village then have to carry the water 




Some respondents also cited the lack of electricity as a major problem. However, 
most agreed that the electricity situation had improved somewhat since the 
November 2001 agreement between the Georgian and Armenian governments 
whereby the Armenian government agreed to supply electricity directly to the 
region (see above). 
 
Inadequate health care is also perceived as a major concern. There is a hospital in 
Akhalkalaki where most medical procedures can be carried out, including surgery. 
Although there is a surgical facility at Ninotsmida hospital, there is no anaesthetist 
working there, and so only emergency operations are carried out in Ninotsminda by 
fetching an anaesthetist from Akhalkalaki. On one occasion at least, an emergency 
operation was carried out in Ninostminda without an adequate anaesthetic30. The 
situation is even worse in the villages, especially when the roads are closed. Most 
villages do not have their own midwife and many women therefore have to give 
birth at home without the proper medical supervision. There is a district doctor who 




All respondents who expressed an opinion on political issues criticised the present 
form of local government in the region. While no respondents advocated separation 
from the Georgian state and only a minority advocated full autonomy for Javakheti 
within Georgia, all supported significant reforms in local self-government, even 
those who held positions in local power structures. Most believe existing local self-
government in Javakheti to be a façade and complained that the existing elected 
bodies or sakrebulos have no real power. Even those who did not advocate full 
autonomy proposed three major changes to the existing system. First, they believed 
that the rayon gamgebeli should be directly elected and not appointed by the 
President. Second, they argued that the number of first-tier (i.e. village or 
community) sakrebulos should be increased considerably, so that most, if not all, 
villages should have their own sakrebulos. Finally, most were in favour of either 
abolishing the governor’s office entirely or giving Javakheti mkhare status with its 
own governor, possibly by adding Aspindza rayon to the two existing rayons of 
Javakheti. 




Opinions differ on the desirability of autonomy for Javakheti. Most of those who 
hold positions in local state structures and some of those who work for NGOs 
opposed autonomy for Javakheti on the grounds that it would be financially 
unsustainable. They pointed out that both Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda rayons rely 
on transfers from the centre, which, while paltry, amount to a considerably greater 
sum of money than revenues generated from within the region. Some had harsh 
words for proponents of autonomy, brandishing them as provocateurs who are 
seeking to exploit the difficult economic circumstances for their own political 
ambitions. 
 
Those favouring autonomy, on the other hand, argued that as an autonomous region, 
Javakheti would be able to set its own priorities and develop its own economy. 
Artificial obstacles that have been erected by a corrupt and over-centralised state 
are holding hack economic development, in their view. Once autonomy is achieved, 
they maintain, sufficient local income would be generated to improve the situation. 
Even “autonomists” viewed Georgia as “our state” (for good or for bad), even 
though they were harshly critical of Tbilisi’s perceived policy of deliberate neglect. 
 
Opinion on the desirability of learning the Georgian language is also divided. Some 
respondents, particularly those working in local state structures, cited knowledge of 
Georgian as a top priority, arguing that only with a proper working knowledge of 
Georgian can ethnic Armenians play a full role as citizens of the state. Others, 
however, believe that while it is important for young people and for the 
intelligentsia to know the state language, any attempt to force the ordinary 
population to learn Georgian would at best be a waste of time and money and would 
at worst be tantamount to forced assimilation. One respondent, Virk’s leader David 
Rstakyan, argued that as Georgia is not a mono-ethnic state, it should not only have 
one official state language. Instead he proposed a Swiss model in which every 
“canton” of Georgia (for example, Javakheti) would have its own official language. 
 
Finally, some respondents highlighted their concern at the lack of objective and 
multilingual information received in Javakheti, especially in terms of Georgian 
current affairs and Georgian legislation. Several believed it a priority to establish 
reliable Internet access in Javakheti, which has hitherto been lacking since the main 
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Georgian Internet providers do not provide access to the region. The only Internet 
point that exists in Javakheti today is provided by satellite link in Akhalkalaki’s 
Internet café (see above). Several respondents of Ninotsminda particularly lamented 
the fact that the Internet is not available there. 
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V. REGIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND ECMI ACTION 
 
The international community must do its utmost to reverse a growing tide of 
cynicism amongst the population of Javakheti, who increasingly perceive that 
international organizations promise much but deliver little. International 
organisations have had a presence (albeit a token one) in the region for nearly ten 
years; however, with a few notable exceptions, little evidence can be seen of it. 
Short-term thinking is a key problem; projects often have a duration of no more 
than three years, which is an insufficient time period to make a meaningful and 
lasting impact on the economy of the region. This is especially true after the 
emphasis moved from humanitarian assistance to development; generally 
development projects that have a short-term horizon prove difficult to sustain in the 
long term. 
 
The shift in emphasis away from humanitarian aid is not a wholly positive 
development. While it is important that communities do not become over-dependent 
on aid, as long as the government lacks the capacity to provide physical and 
financial security in the event of unforeseen catastrophes, such as freak weather 
conditions or plagues of crop-destroying pests, there will remain the need for 
humanitarian assistance on an ad hoc basis in response to such crises. The recent 
plague of field mice is a case in point. It would be of great advantage to the poor 
agricultural communities of Javakheti if international donor organisations could 
supply free mouse poison to small producers, ideally in a form that does not result 
in the destruction of the local stork population that feeds on the mice. Even in the 
most developed countries, local communities are not expected to “fend for 
themselves” in the event of such unforeseen crises; generally national governments 
are expected to support them. In cases where national governments are unable to 
provide such support, international organisations can play an immensely important 
role in terms of substitution. 
 
So-called community mobilisation has been tried and tested in many parts of the 
developing world, especially over the last ten years, with mixed results. In the 
Caucasus, community mobilisation has become a major component of most projects 
supported by the largest donor organisation in the region, USAID, and is used in 
projects supported by other donor organisations too. On certain occasions it has 
contributed positively to the social and economic life of the target community, 
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while on others the community organisations that have been created have proved 
unsustainable and the projects cease once donor money is withdrawn. In part, this 
has been due to a short-term horizon, and in part it has been because community 
development initiatives have been too project-oriented and have not explored the 
concept of what a community-based organization (CBO) should be. Instead they 
(possibly unwittingly) fostered the idea that CBOs were there simply to “do 
projects” and to spend money. Thus the idea of a CBO as a part of community 
culture that mobilizes the population, takes care of the socially vulnerable and even 
organizes cultural events has failed to materialise. The notion that “someone from 
above should provide” still prevails. The result is that many CBOs simply collapse 
as soon as donor funding runs out. 
 
In Javakheti under present circumstances, there is a clear need for some kind of 
NGO or CBO at grass roots level to represent ordinary villagers and to articulate 
their interests and needs both to local power structures and to donor organizations 
operating in the region. This need is particularly pressing given the absence of 
organs of local self-government (i.e. sakrebulos) in most villages. Some donor 
organizations, most notably Horizonti and Mercy Corps, have already begun to 
establish these types of organizations and ECMI aims at contributing further to 
these efforts. Their experience and the experience of other organizations that are 
engaged in community mobilization in the Caucasus region help us to draw some 
lessons that can be applied to further community mobilization work in Javakheti. 
 
Empowerment of villages through the establishment of village NGOs or CBOs will 
only be effective if there is some linking mechanism to connect these organizations 
with local power structures. With this end in mind it may make sense to create some 
kind of “community union” at rayon level, which would bring together 
representatives of village community organizations with members of community 
sakrebulos and representatives of the gamgeoba at rayon level. It would be helpful 
to include the rayon gamgebeli in this process as well. 
 
The aim of community mobilisation at village level should not merely be to carry 
out projects (even though this will be a vital element of what they do); the CBO 




ECMI is currently in the process of establishing a project which seeks to promote 
regional integration of the Javakheti Region and defuse the risks of increased inter-
ethnic tension. The aim is to establish a network consisting of civil society actors 
that will include representatives of most ethnic and religious groups, government 
officials from within Javakheti and from the governor’s office in Akhaltsikhe, as 
well as representatives of the central authorities in Tbilisi. In this way, the project 
will seek to improve inter-ethnic relations, broaden the consultative process of 
decision-making, and increase effective public participation and public awareness 
of local governance. The project will promote the integration of the region by 
involving province and state level policy-makers in the network, thereby creating 
firmer links between regional actors and central levels of authority. In conjunction 
with the network, the project will enhance the capacity of less advanced regional 
communities by facilitating community mobilization and providing capacity 
building, in order to ensure their participation in the consultative process.   
 
ECMI is establishing the dialogue network through the organization of bi-annual 
plenary assembly conferences and constituent monthly Expert Committee 
Workshops to address key issues of relevance to stakeholders. The Expert 
Committees, working to address technical issues of relevance to all communities in 
Javakheti, will ensure that regional concerns are articulated and will serve as an 
important link in the communication between the regional level and the provincal 
and central authorities. Over the coming 1-2 years the new Georgian government 
plans to elaborate new structures for regional development and integration, and in 
this process the ECMI network will serve as an important instrument to ensure that 
the relationship between the centre and the region are strengthened and that local 
concerns are taken into account when new legislative provisions are drafted. The 
project will enhance the capacity of the Government of Georgia to acquaint itself 
with accurate, objective and up-to-date information on the economic and political 
situation in Javakheti in elaborating a clear and coherent policy towards the region.  
 
The recommendations and support offered by the network, as well as the much 
needed dialogue in itself, is expected to contribute to a long-term improvement in 
the regional integration of Javakheti into the Georgian state, by securing a broader 
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regional participation in the decision-making process and reducing the conflict 
potential of an eventual closure of the Russian military base in Akhalkalaki.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
